The integration of ego and reality consists in, and the continued integrity of ego and reality depends on, transference of unconscious processes and “contents” on to new experiences and objects of contemporary life. In pathological transferences the transformation of primary into secondary processes and the continued interplay between them has been replaced by super-impositions of secondary on primary processes, so that they exist side by side, isolated from each other. Freud has described this constellation in his paper on The Unconscious (pp. 175-176): “Actually there is no lifting of the repression until the conscious idea, after the resistances have been overcome, has entered into connection with the unconscious memory trace. It is only through the making conscious of the latter itself that success is achieved” (italics mine). In an analytic interpretation “the identity of the information given to the patient with his repressed memory is only apparent. To have heard something and to have experienced something are in their psychological nature two different things, even though the content of both is the same.”
Hans Loewald – The Essential Loewald: Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis p.252
The primary process has been called primary because it is developmentally the first, the earliest form of mentation, and because it is seen as more primitive than secondary process. But the process is primary in a deeper sense insofar as it is unitary, non-differentiating, non-discriminating between various elements or components of a global event or experience. Thinking in terms of elements or components of an experience or act already bespeaks secondary process thinking. In primary process mentation oneness, as against duality or multiplicity, is dominant. In secondary-process mentation duality and multiplicity are dominant, i.e., differentiation, division, a splitting of what was unitary, global, unstructured oneness.
Hans Loewald – The Essential Loewald: Primary Process, Secondary Process, and Language p.196
I have now come to the end of what I had to say upon this case. There remain two problems, of the many that it raised, which seem to me to deserve special emphasis. The first relates to the phylogenetically inherited schemata, which, like the categories of philosophy, are concerned with the business of “placing” the impressions derived from actual experience. I am inclined to take the view that they are precipitates from the history of human civilization. The Oedipus complex, which comprises a child’s relation to its parents, is one of them – is, in fact, the best known member of the class. Wherever experiences fail to fit in with the hereditary schema, they become remodeled in the imagination – a process which might very profitably be followed out in detail. It is precisely such cases that are calculated to convince us of the independent existence of the schema. We are often able to see the schema triumphing over the experience of the individual; as when in our present case the boy’s father became the castrator and the menace to his infantile sexuality in spite of what was in other respects an inverted Oedipus complex. A similar process is at work where a nurse comes to play the mother’s part or where the two become fused together. The contradiction between experience and the schema seem to introduce an abundance of material in the conflicts of childhood.
The second problem is not far removed from the first, but it is incomparably more important. If one considers the behaviors of the four-year-old child towards the re-activated primal scene. Or even if one thinks of the far simpler reactions of the one-and-a-half-year-old child when the scene was actually experienced, it is hard to dismiss the view that some sort of hardly definable knowledge, something, as it were, preparatory to an understanding, was at work in the child at the time. What this may have consisted in we can form no conception; we have nothing at our disposal but the single analogy – and it is an excellent one – of the far reaching instinctive knowledge of animals.
If human beings too possessed an instinctive endowment such as this, it would not be surprising that it should be very particularly concerned with the processes of sexual life, even though it could not be by any means confined to them. This instinctive factor would then be the nucleus of the unconscious, a primitive kind of mental activity, which would later be dethroned and overlaid by human reason, when the faculty came to be acquired, but which in some people, perhaps in every one, would retain the power of drawing down to it the higher mental processes. Repression would be the return to this instinctive stage, and man would thus be paying for his great new acquisition with his liability to neuroses, and would be bearing witness by the possibility of the neuroses to the existence of those earlier, instinct-like, preliminary stages. But the significance of the traumas of early childhood would lie in the fact that to this unconscious they would contribute material which would save it from being worn away by the subsequent course of development.
Sigmund Freud – Three Case Histories p.278